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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Over the last decade the private equity (PE) industry has experienced an 
important growing in the process of value creation in portfolio companies. However, in 
Portugal, this process seems not to be yet sufficiently developed in many aspects.  
Although all stages (entry, holding and exit) of the PE process are important, it 
is also very important to understand whether portfolio companies continue to sustain 
themselves and generate value/growth for all its stakeholders after the PE investor 
leaves the company. 
Despite the vast literature on the topic about the impact of value creation by the 
PE activity during the holding stage, there are no studies about the impact of PE after an 
exit strategy in Portugal, in terms of operational performance and capital structure. 
This dissertation seeks to fill this gap and develop a deepen study about this 
subject on the Portuguese companies. We intend to analyse the impact of the PE exit on  
the operating performance of Portuguese PE industry, using a self-collected sample of 
30 companies exited (disinvested) by a PE between 2005 and 2012. 
 The results show that target companies experienced a significant increase in their 
total assets and turnover after PE leaves the company. However, the target companies 
faced a decrease in earnings before interest, taxes, depreciations and amortizations 
(EBITDA) and a deterioration of the operating performance measures. The worst 
operating performances persist even after being adjusted for industry changes, 
suggesting that this can only be very partially explained by time and industry effects. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The financial crisis sweeping global markets is reshaping the landscape of 
private equity (PE) investing. The credit reduction by banking institutions has limited 
the availability of leverage leading to the search for other sources of funding. Thus, in 
recent decades, the PE activity has come to mark your place in the Portuguese market as 
an important source of funding. It is essential not only for the development and growth 
of small medium enterprises (SME), but also to the stability of any business. 
The academic discussion of value creation in PE exit transactions still has not 
been sufficiently analyzed in the Portuguese PE industry. The aim of this dissertation is 
to provide a better understanding of value creation/growth in PE transactions, more 
specifically to analyse in terms of capital structure and operational performance, and to 
compare the period’s post-exit strategy with the previous full fiscal year before the exit. 
There are several studies on the topic about the impact by the PE companies 
during the holding stage, but research related with the impact after the exit / divestment 
strategy is not seem to be sufficiently developed in Portugal. 
In essence, the goal of this dissertation is to analyse the effect of the PE 
ownership in a company after an exit strategy (in the long term perspective), filling this 
gap in the literature and to develop a deeper study with Portuguese companies that have 
gone through by an exit strategy, comparing the years after exit with the full fiscal year 
before the exit.  
By doing this we intend to understand and answer two main questions: Will the 
normal improvements expected by PE firms stands after an exit strategy or, instead, are 
easily eliminated? What happens to the capital structure of the company and operational 
performance after the exit strategy?  
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In section 2, a review 
of the academic literature is presented. Section 3 explains the methodology, namely the 
sample selection process and all the empirical results regarding the portfolio companies’ 
post-exit operating performance and capital structure. An analysis by exit route was also 
performed. Section 4 concludes. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. THE DIFFERENT PHASES OF A PE TRANSACTION 
 
Three main phases can be distinguished in a typical buyout: the acquisition 
phase, holding period and exit / divestment phase. 
 
2.1.1. ACQUISITION PHASE 
 
The acquisition phase starts with the negotiation and due diligence process, 
during which the investors familiarizes themselves with the company and develop a 
business plan for the buyout. This acquisition phase is a critical step for the success of 
the buyout investment as a whole.   
 Two different types of value creation could be distinguished in this phase: one at 
the time of negotiating the acquisition price and the other in the moment of developed 
the strategic plan. Regarding the first phase, the acquisition price of the company may 
be a barrier for all future evaluations and determines the break-even-point for the equity 
investors. On the other hand, the strategic plan phase sets the goal and changes to be 
implemented in the company in order to improve the performance during the holding 
period.  
 Some authors (e.g., Baker & Montgomery, 1994) argued that “much of the 
buyout value generation is front loaded, in that it is determined through decisions that 
are already taken during the acquisition phase”.  
 
2.1.2. HOLDING PHASE 
 
The holding period is described as the phase where strategic, organizational and 
operational changes prescribed in the initial business plan are implemented and the 
intended operational improvements are realized. This phase typically lasts between 3 to 
5 years in Europe, and it is the most crucial phase for the value creation in the buyout 
process.  
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In practice, this is more an iterative phase than a linear process because the 
business plan and all the strategies are constantly changed.   
 
2.1.3. EXIT / DIVESTMENT PHASE 
 
The divestment or exit is the final phase of a buyout and it is during this period 
that the investment return is determined. For investors, this is the crucial part of a 
buyout because is when they realize the returns and determines the difference between 
acquisition and exit price. The period after this phase will be addressed throughout this 
dissertation, as well as the impact that PE companies create, even after the divestment 
phase. 
 Therefore, the potential exit opportunities from an investment play an important 
role in an investor’s decision about whether or not to invest in a company. Generally 
speaking, several methods are available to PE investors to exit their investment. The 
most important and largely used exits routes are: Initial Public Offering (IPO), Trade 
Sales, Secondary buyout and Leverage Recapitalization. 
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2.2. PRIVATE EQUITY (PE) AND THE MAIN VALUE DRIVERS 
 
Value creation in PE-backed companies results from various sources and 
therefore has to be analyzed on different aspects. Jensen (1989) refers that the primary 
source of value creation in buyouts come from organizational changes that lead to 
improvements in firms' operating and investment decisions and shows that “these 
organizations are not managed to maximize earnings per share but to maximize value, 
with a strong emphasis on cash flow”. Loos (2005) distinguished between drivers that 
have a direct effect on the operating efficiency or relate to the optimal utilization of 
assets of the company and drivers which are non-operational in nature, but lead to an 
expansion of value created. Several authors, such as Pindur (2007), Brigl et al.(2008), 
Guo et al. (2011), Achleitner et al. (2011), also show that there are three main potential 
explanations for the value creation: positive changes in operating performance, in 
evaluation multiples and in leverage. To these authors, firms´ value increase if there are 
improvements in operating performance, such as improve profitability, elimination of 
unproductive assets and through value increasing acquisitions. Firms benefit also from a 
positive change on market or industry multiples while the firm is in the hands of the PE 
firm. Finally, higher leverage also leads to larger tax shields which increase the cash 
flow available to the providers of capital (Guo et al., 2011).        
 Regarding the operational performance source of value, several studies (Acharya 
et al., 2013; Cumming et al., 2007; Kaplan, 1989; Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1990) have 
analyzed this aspect and show that leveraged buyouts (LBO) create value by improving 
the operating performance. Guo et al. (2011) also demonstrate that operational 
improvements of PE-backed firms exceed those of comparable publicly listed peers.  
 Comparing with the improvements in operating performance much less research 
is available regarding changes in valuation multiples. However, Acharya et al. (2013) and 
Guo et al. (2011) conclude that PE-backed firms improved the valuation multiples 
between entry and exit more than the group of public benchmarks not backed by PE 
sponsors. Guo et al. (2011) shows that changes in industry EBITDA multiples over the 
holding period accounts for 18% of the returns to total pre-buyout capital and 12% to 
total post-buyout capital.         
 Several studies analyze the third mechanism of value creation, the leverage. 
Axelson et al. (2010) show that when credit is abundant and cheap, buyouts become 
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more leveraged and consequently leads to an improvement in the cash flows. Kaplan 
(1989) concludes that higher leverage ratios are associated with larger tax shields. 
Finally, Guo et al. (2011) refer that the effect of debt increased the available cash flow 
to the providers of capital.  
 More recently, the authors have begun to pay more attention to corporate 
governance mechanisms as a source of value creation. In fact, according to Jensen´s 
(1986, 1989) free-cash-flow (FCF) theory, LBO results in corporate governance 
mechanisms that reduce agency costs and increase firm value through improved 
operating efficiency. Consistent with this Jensen´s theory, Kaplan (1989), Smith (1990), 
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990), Acharya (2010) and others provide evidence that LBO 
do create value by significantly improving the operating performance of acquired 
companies and by create cash in the form of high debt payments. 
In this dissertation we will follow more in detail the first two drives of value 
creation – Operating Performance and Leverage, not only due to the data available but 
also because they represent the main two sources of value. 
 
 
 
 
2.2.1. OPERATING PERFORMANCE 
 
Following the buyout it is expected the improvement of operating performance 
and the investment decision. A buyout is also more likely to occur in companies that 
show significant potential to generate higher cash flows (Kaplan, 1989; Lichtenberg & 
Siegel, 1990; Smith, 1990).  
A substantial literature show that buyout transactions have a positive effect on 
the operational performance of target companies (Achleitner, 2010, 2011; Brigl et al., 
2008; Cumming, 2007; Guo et al., 2011; Groh, 2009; Jensen, 1989; Kaplan, 1989; 
Lichtenberg & Siegel, 1990; Loos, 2005; Nikoskelainen, 2007; Pindur, 2007; Smith, 
1990). 
Kaplan (1989) provides early evidence of management buyouts' strong 
improvements in operating performance, even after adjustments for industry-wide 
changes. He finds that PE-backed firms experience increase in operating income, 
increase in net cash flow and decrease in capital expenditures (CAPEX).  
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Smith (1990) proves that the improvements in operating cash flows are 
correlated with the buyout-induced changes in debt ratio and ownership structure, 
consistent with Jensen's (1989) argument that organizational changes play an important 
role in the efficiency gains. 
Loos (2005) conclude that 25% of value creation comes from sales growth. 
Pindur (2007) proves that EBITDA growth represents 45% in the increase of value of 
portfolio firms and only 28% and 22% comes from change in multiples and FCF effect, 
respectively.  
Guo et al. (2011) show that changes in operating performance and in industry 
evaluation multiples each account for approximately 20% of returns to pre-buyout 
capital. They find that gains in operating performance are either comparable to or 
slightly exceed those observed for benchmark firms matched on industry and pre-
buyout characteristics, depending on the measure of performance and the post-buyout 
period considered. Brigl et al. (2008) proves that 46% of value creation comes from 
sales growth and 10% from margin expansion.  
Achleitner et al. (2011) find that EBITDA multiple expansion has a strong 
influence on equity internal rate of return (IRR) and prove that managing and timing the 
valuation of the buyout company is an important acquired skill of successful PE firms, 
and not simply a matter of luck.  
Chung (2011) while studying the buyout of private companies found that in that 
type of companies rather than improving operating efficiency these firms grow in size 
and make greater investments. Companies experienced an increase in EBITDA –
industry-adjusted EBITDA grows by 12% during the three post-buyout years – but 
margins do not improve and these companies face a decline in the average profitability 
after the buyout. 
However, Achleitner et al. (2012) conclude that two-thirds of value creation can 
be attributed to operational and market effects and the remaining (only one-third) is due 
to leverage effect. Comparing smaller to larger deals they also show that the leverage 
effect is higher for larger deals while revenue growth plays a more important role for 
smaller deals, and deals completed in a recessionary environment generate higher 
median returns based on a higher use of leverage and more significantly multiple 
expansion.  
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2.2.2. LEVERAGE / FINANCIAL ENGINEERING 
 
Regarding the leverage, the use of significant amounts of debt in a PE 
transaction contributes to value creation itself as it represents an important factor in the 
financing structure of the transaction. The value creation results not only from the high 
leverage used that allows magnifying the return, but also from tax savings and from the 
management focus on cash flows to ensure simplicity in the investment and sustainable 
growth of the company. Some authors (e.g., Berg and Gottschalg, 2003) call this type of 
value driver, Financial Engineering, “which means that the optimisation of capital 
structure and minimization of after-tax of capital of the portfolio company is one of the 
most widely acknowledged levers applied by buyout associations to create value”.  
Ross (1977, 1978) shows that under asymmetric information, managers with 
satisfactory information are likely to hold a large share of the firm’s stock and obtain 
outside financing disproportionably with debt. 
Grossman and Hart
1
 (1982) explain the use of debt as a financial instrument and 
argue that debt can induce management to act in the interest of investors in ways that 
cannot be duplicated with optimally designed compensation packages.  
Jensen (1986, 1989) also found that the use of debt in buyouts facilitates a 
reduction of available FCF and enforces managers to attend debt payments rather than 
spend it inefficiently.   
Kaplan (1989) studied the tax benefits and the evolution of American debt in a 
sample of 76 management buyouts and proves that  book-value (BV) ratio increased 
from an average of 20.7% to 85.6% after operation, which reflects the high leverage 
used. He also showed, as well as Kaplan and Stein (1993), that systematic risk of equity 
in leveraged buyouts is much smaller than what would normally be expected given the 
amount of financial leverage in these transactions.  
Papelu (1990) gives one explanation for the superior performance of equity in 
buyout transactions and the substantially lower risks – the beneficial organizational 
changes. He shows, under this hypothesis, that although LBO increases the financial 
risk of the company, they reduce business risk at the same time. A study developed by 
                                               
1The authors stated the idea that “in a corporation owned by many small shareholders there is an 
“incentive problem”; i.e., the managers (or directors) have goals of their own, such as the enjoyment of 
perquisites or the maximization of their own income, which are at variance with the goals of shareholders, 
which we assume to be profit or market value maximization” 
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Jensen et al. (1992) show evidence of operating risk reductions in a case study of a 
leveraged buyout developed by Loos (2005). 
Opler and Titman (1993) prove that a larger percentage of LBO firms use more 
debt than is needed to eliminate taxes, which means that the role of debt rather relates to 
the incentive problems associated with FCF and the cost of financial distress are 
therefore considered to be much lower. They also argue that FCF problems as well as 
potential financial distress costs are important determinants of which firms undertake 
LBO and in some periods of time they found out that firms undertaking LBO are more 
diversified than other firms in the economy.  
Achleitner et al. (2010) found evidence in a sample of 206 European buyouts 
between the period 1991 and 2005 that 32% of the value created in these operations was 
explained by effects on leverage. They also showed that this effect was greater for 
larger deals given their greater debt capacity. On the other hand, they found that the 
median debt-to-equity ratio (DE) decreased from 1.4 at the time of operation to 0.6 at 
the time of divestment, which proves the strategy of creating value in this type of 
operations.  
Acharya et al. (2013) in a study involving 66 businesses in the United Kingdom 
reached similar results, namely, a median ratio of 1.6 at the time of operation and 0.6 at 
exit. They also described similar developments in debt / EBITDA ratio: register 5.1 at 
operation time and 4.0 in the divestment / exit time.  
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2.3. EXIT / DIVESTMENT 
 
In line with the strong growth in Europe over the past decades, PE in Portugal as 
a form of financial intermediation has become a focus interest for academic research. 
However, even in Europe, only few studies to date concentrate on the divestment stage 
of portfolio companies, the so-called, exit process. 
 
2.3.1. DIFFERENT TYPES OF EXIT TRANSACTIONS 
 
According to the definition of many authors in this field, there are five main 
types of PE portfolio company exits: trade sales, secondary buyout, IPO, buy-backs and 
write-offs (Cumming and Macintosh, 2001, 2003a, 2003b; Gompers and Lerner, 1999; 
Wright and Robbie, 1998).    
 The trade sale is a sale of a portfolio company to a trade buyer and is usually 
referred as “mergers or acquisitions exit”. Several academic authors analyze this 
common exit route for European venture capital and PE industry (e.g., Wright et al., 
1993). 
 On the other hand, secondary buyout is a transaction where a company is sold 
from one financial sponsor to another. The key difference to a trade sale is that only the 
PE fund sells its interest to a trade buyer, while the entrepreneur or management and 
other investors retain their stakes in the company (Povaly, 2007). 
 The third type of exit, IPO, represents a sell of the company shares to public 
investors and has many studies in the literature, such as, Cumming and Macintosh 
(2003b).  
 Regarding the buy-backs, in this form of exit transaction a PE fund sells its 
shares back to the company or entrepreneur that sold the originally shares. Otherwise, 
the last type of exit route, write-off, occurs when a venture capitalist walks away from 
its investment, not able to realize initially expected returns (Povaly, 2007).  
Gompers and Lerner (1998) show that in order to maximize stated returns, PE 
firms distribute shares of portfolio companies to their investor following IPO rather than 
selling shares themselves. They also refer that PE firms have preference in distributions 
which allow them to lock-in stated returns which are relevant for their compensation 
before negative impact on stock prices occur. 
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 Bascha and Walz (2001) prove that convertible securities, debt securities with an 
option to be converted into equity, are superior to a pure mix of debt and equity in a 
portfolio firm’s capital structure and leads to optimal exit decisions. Convertible 
securities minimize conflicts of interest between the venture capitalist and the 
entrepreneur or manager of the company. 
Cumming and Macintosh (2003a) show, by doing a statistical analysis of survey 
data, that the link between information asymmetry is not only the choice of exit route 
but also the degree of the divestment (partial vs. total).   
 Shepherd et al. (2003) found that inexperienced investors’ unfamiliarity with the 
decision structure contributes to errors in judgment. Highly experienced investors are 
often driven by intuition and heuristic processing which makes decisions susceptible to 
forms of bias and error. 
Lieber (2004) shows that a proactive exits process planning (from the time of the 
acquisition) is crucial and that the co-operation between PE investors and portfolio 
company management is necessary to ensure an overall process success. 
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2.3.2. EUROPE VS PORTUGAL 
 
Table 1 presents the amount exited by PE investors by exit type in Portugal 
during the years 2011 and 2012. In 2012 the amount of divestment in PE-backed 
companies decrease to €91 million (from 49 divestments) from € 99 million (from 48 
divestments) in 2011. 
The exit strategy in terms of number of operations focused primarily in buyback 
transactions (to the management team or shareholders), trade sales and write-off. All 
accounted for 73% of the number of divestiture. The trade sale accounts for €53 million 
due largely to an important operation that skews the average amount divesture from the 
trade sale. The buyback transactions involved € 14 million while increasing the number 
of transactions from 18 to 26. Regarding write-off operations, the amount involved 
increase from 0.3 million (in 2011) to 12 million euros in 2012.  
As in previous years, the divestment of stakes in companies financed by 
Portuguese PE investors via IPO was once again absent.    
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Table 1: Divestment in Portugal by exit route 
 
 
2011 2012 
Amounts in € thousands 
Amount  
at cost 
% 
Number of 
companies 
% 
Amount  
at cost 
% 
Number of 
companies 
% 
Exit route                 
Divestment by trade sale 7 683 7.7 4 8.0 52 616 57.8 8 14.5 
Divestment by public offering 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Divestment by write-off 304 0.3 5 10.0 12 106 13.3 6 10.9 
Repayment of silent 
partnerships 
0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.0 1 1.8 
Repayment of principal loans 3 795 3.8 13 26.0 2 033 2.2 7 12.7 
Secondary buyout (SBO) 5 486 5.5 2 4.0 1 606 1.8 4 7.3 
Sale to financial institution 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Sale to management 1 938 2.0 18 36.0 14 075 15.5 26 47.3 
Divestment by other means 80 120 80.7 8 16.0 8 554 9.4 3 5.5 
Total divestment 99 325 100.0 48 100.0 90 991 100.0 49 100.0 
         Source: EVCA(2013) 
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 Figure 1 compares the exit routes used by Portuguese and Europeans investors. 
 
Figure 1: Comparison of divestment activity between Europe and Portugal 
(%) (EVCA. 2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Like in Portugal, the IPO in Europe is also the exit strategy less used. However, 
contrary to Portugal secondary buyout (SBO) gained greater relevance. 
Divestments / exits in Europe, in terms of number, increase in 2012 compared to 
2011 and remained strong as the second highest ever recorded level in Europe. 
However, in terms of amount at cost, exits in Europe reached € 21.6 billion in 2012 
compared to €30.3 billion in 2011. The amount for 2012 was driven by a very large 
transaction, which by itself accounted for more than 60% of the total exit value. Already 
in 2011 two large transactions accounted for 63% of the total.  
 In 2012, trade sale stood out as the most notable exit route in Europe. The 
amount of exit value recorded in this category was driven significantly by the one large 
exit noted earlier and caused trade sales to account for 36.4% of the total exit amount. It 
is also important to notice that secondary buyout appears as the second exit route more 
important with a total amount in 2012 of € 5.5 billion (25.7% of the total).  
 Public offering exits in Europe in 2012 suffered a slight increase to14.8% in the 
total amount compared to11.6% in 2011. Europe has historically experienced very few 
write-offs and sales to management. Both together explain 11.2% of the total amount at 
cost. 
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A survey carry out by Price Waterhouse Corporate Finance (EVCA, 2010) 
shows that European PE consider IPO as the ideal exit and consequently do not devote 
enough attention to trade sales and also that many PE do not plan for exit from the date 
of investment. They also prove that most PE does not promote their investments widely 
enough and many do not make full use of intermediaries to help them. The management 
of a company is considered by them an obstacle to a profitable exit.  
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Table 2: Divestment in Europe by exit route 
 
 
  2011 2012 
Amounts in € thousands 
Amount  
at cost % 
Number of 
companies % 
Amount  
at cost % 
Number of 
companies % 
Exit route 
                
Divestment by trade sale 11 326 038 37.3 456 21.4 7 858 264 36.4 365 16.8 
Divestment by public offering 3 504 469 11.6 118 5.5 3 203 528 14.8 93 4.3 
Divestment by write-off 3 877 200 12.8 322 15.1 1 928 099 8.9 402 18.6 
Repayment of silent partnerships 307 549 1.0 430 20.1 235 578 1.1 470 21.7 
Repayment of principal loans 1 120 581 3.7 192 9.0 1 042 103 4.8 232 10.7 
Secondary buyout 7 855 466 25.9 285 13.3 5 545 439 25.7 268 12.4 
Sale to financial institution 1 433 905 4.7 45 2.1 754 543 3.5 77 3.6 
Sale to management 660 791 2.2 213 10.0 482 612 2.2 182 8.4 
Divestment by other means 243 211 0.8 74 3.5 552 587 2.6 78 3.6 
Total divestment 30 329 210 100.0 2 057 100.0 21 602 754 100.0 2 100 100.0 
         
         Source: EVCA(2013) 
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3. AN ANALYSIS OF POST-EXIT PORTFOLIO COMPANIES IN PORTUGAL –
EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
In this section the sample and the methodology will be presented as well as the 
main findings concerning the capital structure and operational performance change after a 
PE investor leaves the company. 
 First of all, the main criteria used in defining the sample will be explained and all 
the characteristics of the companies backed by PE firms that performed the divestment / 
exit in Portugal will be presented.   
 Subsequently, the methodology adopted as well as the main key indicators of the 
companies included in the sample is explained.  
 Finally, the results regarding the impact of a PE exit / divestment strategy 
(comparing to the previous full fiscal year before de exit) will be presented. This impact 
will be analysed in terms of (i) operational performance and (ii) capital structure.  
 
 
 
3.1. DATA AND SELECTED SAMPLE 
 
In order to select our sample, the Capital IQ database
2
 was used. This database is 
commercialized and managed by Standards & Poor’s and provides information of the 
company name, acquisition date and the buyers/investors.  
 First, we select all transactions that fulfil the follow requirements: (i) the portfolio 
company must have its headquarters in Portugal; (ii) the investors (buyers) must meet one 
of the following criteria: “Private Investment Firm”, “Financial Service Investment Arm”, 
“Public Investment Firm”, “Public Fund”, “All investment Firms” or “Private Fund 
(Special Purpose Issuer Trust)”; (iii) the type of transaction is “Private Placements”; and 
(iv) the transactions occurred between the years 2005 and 2012. According these 
requirements 87 transactions were selected. 
 Then, 16 transactions were dropped since they were “cancelled” or simply 
“announced” transactions.  After that, transactions that included the same company (in 
particular new capital injections and listed companies) and where the buyer was a state 
(or related) company were excluded, since these types of transactions may pursue other 
                                               
2
Capital IQ description and potential biases on sample selection are discussed in detail in the appendix. 
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goals than strictly wealth-maximizing objectives, such as territorial development and 
employment growth (Mendes, 2011). By doing this, the sample was reduced to 56 
transactions.  
 Subsequently, and in order to do the analysis of a company after exit / divestment 
strategy, 11 recent exit transaction occurred in 2012 and 2013 were also dropped because 
we do not have a complete fiscal year after that. Thus, the sample decreased to 47 
transactions.   
 After selecting the sample we used the SABI databases
3
, data provided by Bureau 
Van Dijk, which contains financial information for over 20.000 Portuguese companies 
from 1999 onward in order to obtain accounting information of each company, as well as 
the information to the industry level. We could not gather accounting information for the 
year following the exit year for 17 companies and they were excluded and so, our final 
sample was reduced to 30 exits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
3
SABI description and potential biases on sample selection are discussed in detail in the appendix. 
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3.2. METHODOLOGY 
 
In this dissertation, three variables are used to assess the performance of the 
portfolio companies after the exit - Assets, turnover and EBITDA - and were compared 
with the previous full fiscal year before exit. All variables are presented before interests 
and taxes, therefore controlling for effects resulting from leverage or other financial 
decisions.  
In order to assess the operating performance post-exit, following the methodology 
proposed by Jain and Kini (1994), three main indicators were used: (i) EBITDA margin
4
 
as a measure of profitability; (ii) Return on assets
5
 as measure of productivity; (iii) and 
Assets rotation ratio (turnover ratio)
6
 as a measure of efficiency. Many other authors use 
these three ratios to measure operating performance (e.g., Guo et al., 2011; Kaplan, 
1989b). 
On the other hand, to assess the effect of the exit on capital structure we used the 
financial autonomy ratio
7
. 
Growth changes in portfolio companies, operating performance and capital 
structure were measured over a four-year post-exit period (year t+1 to year t+4) related to 
the last full fiscal year before the divestment strategy (year t-1). Having a horizon of 
more than a year we can make better conclusions about the impact that PE firms 
continues to have in the company, even after the exit strategy. The overall change 
between the pre-exit year and the first three full post-exit years (3y avg.) is also 
presented. The fiscal year of the exit (year t) is not considered as it includes both pre- and 
post-exit operations making it difficult to differentiate between pre- and post-exit 
performance. Therefore, we just have used all full fiscal years before and after the exit 
year. 
The growth changes post-exit (in terms of assets, turnover and EBITDA) was 
calculated according to the formula where i refers to the 
company, n to the exit year and t to the number of years before the exit transaction. 
However, the indicators previously presented (to measure operating performance and 
                                               
4
 EBITDA / Turnover   
5
 EBITDA / Total assets   
6
 Turnover/ Total assets 
7
 Equity/Assets: this indicator aims to assess the evolution of the capital structure of a company, as well as 
your leverage. This is the mains indicator used in Portugal to characterize the funding policy adopted, i.e, 
the composition of the equity and debt capital in financing assets. 
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capital structure) were calculated according the following formula
8, where i refers to the company, n to the exit year and t to the number of years before 
the exit transaction. 
The results for each indicator were calculated from the median
9
 of the set of 
changes and they are reported as both unadjusted and adjusted by industry changes during 
the same period. Industry data was extracted from the “Central de Balanços – Árvore de 
análises” by Bank of Portugal. “Central de Balanços” provides all the information – key 
indicators, balance sheet, income statement and cash-flows – according to industry 
classification Rev. CAE 3. 
Unfortunately, industry data provided by “Central de Balanços” suffers from 
severe limitations that narrow substantially the possibilities of analysis. Before 2005 
industry data was obtained through non-mandatory annual surveys. However, since 2006 
these surveys have become compulsory. This change makes income statements and 
balance sheets not directly comparable between these two periods. As a consequence 
some variables cannot be calculated for any industry for the year 2006 since the 
calculation is partly based on the comparisons of the same variables between 2006 and 
2005. Consequently, we selected the indicators previously presented instead of others 
with less or no information.   
Industry matching was based on the company’s four digit CAE Rev. 3 code and 
industry adjustment values are obtained by subtracting the changes in the portfolio 
companies’ operating performance ratios, from the industry average change in the same 
ratio, during the same period. Through this adjustment it is possible to control for both 
time period and industry effects.  
Finally, a Wilcoxon sign rank test was performed to check whether the median 
percentage change in operating performance and industry-adjusted operating performance 
variables are significantly different from zero. 
It is also important to refer that an analysis of performance by exit route was 
developed to analyze the best performance of indicators in each of the exit route and if 
any exit route stands out for its performance. 
                                               
8
 Taking into account the limitations of this methodology, particularly due to the existence of negative 
initial values, was also tested, in terms of operational performance and capital structure, the formula
. However, the obtained results are skewed from reality.  
9
 In this paper, we use the concept of median rather than the mean given the potential distortion that can 
occur due to the heavy weight of outliers that dominate the mean and make the distribution very skewed. 
This outlier dominance may be particularly severe in the presence of a small sample, as is the case here. 
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3.3. STATISTICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE 
 
As we can see in the Table 3, although there is a wide dispersion between the 
years considered in the sample, the transactions occurred mainly during the years 2005 
and 2006. Later, between 2007 and 2008, we can observe a sharp decrease in the PE 
transactions, perhaps related to the onset of the current financial crisis. We detect 
maintenance of the number of investments in the last two years under review, according 
to the evidence already studied.  
Table 3: Distribution of the number of operations per entry year 
 
Entry 
year 
Number of 
transactions 
1999 1 
2000 4 
2001 1 
2002 0 
2003 4 
2004 4 
2005 7 
2006 6 
2007 1 
2008 2 
Total 30 
 
 
On the other hand, the Figure 2 below shows that the exit transactions in the 
selected sample occurred mainly between the years 2007 and 2010, which is also 
consistent with previous evidence. 
Figure 2: Distribution of the number of exit transactions by year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
Table 4 shows the distribution of the holding period. We can notice that we have a 
mean (and median) duration of 4 years which is consistent with the literature and with 
what happens in Europe, in general.  
 
Table 4: Holding Period characteristics 
 
  Holding period 
mean duration 4 
median 4 
max. 10 
min. 1 
 
 
Table 5 describes the distribution of the 30 portfolio companies across industries. 
The transactions occurred in a variety of industries and include almost every sector of 
activity. The predominant sector is the tertiary with the wholesale and retail industry with 
a weighting of 27% in the total sample, immediately followed by manufacturing (23%) 
and Consulting, scientific and technical activities (13%).  
 
Table 5: Distribution of number of operations by sector / economic activities 
(CAE
10
) 
 
 
Sector / economic activities  
Number of 
transactions 
% 
Consulting, scientific and technical 
activities 
4 13% 
Information and communication activities 3 10% 
Manufacturing 7 23% 
Wholesale and retail 8 27% 
Other 8 27% 
Total 30 100% 
 
  
The Table 6 ranks the PE firms according to the number of deals completed. All 
the top 5 firms reported are Portuguese and clearly dominate the market. In fact, an entity 
belonging to a banking group represent a weight of 17% in the total sample indicating the 
                                               
10
Portuguese Classification of Economic Activities Revision 3 (CAE Rev. 3) according to the National 
Statistics Institute. 
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important presence of the banking sector in this type of investment, unlike what happens 
in other markets such as the UK and the United States (Mendes, 2011). 
Overall, these results put in evidence a market predominately domestic, with little 
competition and dominated by four major PE houses, where banks and their affiliate PE 
firms are more important than independent PE firms. 
 
Table 6: Distribution of the number of operations by general partner 
 
General partner 
Number of 
transactions 
% 
CA Consult SA 3 10% 
Explorer Investments, S.C.R. S.A. 3 10% 
Change Partners - SCR. S.A. 3 10% 
Portugal Capital Ventures 4 13% 
Espírito Santo Capital. S.C.R.. 
S.A. 5 17% 
Others 12 40% 
Total 30 100% 
 
 
The Table 7 proves that the main type of exit route in Portugal is the Trade sale as 
previously presented in section 2.3.2. In fact, also the SBO has had an increasing impact 
on the Portuguese market. Buyback occupies the second position and is consistent with 
Cumming and Macintosh (2003b) hypothesise that in circumstances of high information 
asymmetries (and in Portugal it seems to be large) one of the exit routes preferences from 
a value maximisation is the buyback.  
Table 7: Distribution of number of operations by exit route 
 
Exit Route 
Number of 
transactions 
Buyback 10 
Trade sale 13 
SBO   7 
Total 30 
  
Table 8 presents the main characteristics of companies considered in the sample in 
the exit / divestment year (t). There is a considerable size of the companies that received 
intervention of Portuguese PE funds with average assets (median) of €28.5 million (€12 
million). The mean (median) of liabilities is €21.1million (€8.4 million), while the mean 
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(median) of EBITDA is €2 million (€0.6 million). Also the small number of employees 
reflects small businesses and meets the type of companies that invest more in PE in 
Portugal–SME.  
 As expected, all variables exhibit significantly smaller values compared to those 
seen in previous operating performance studies (Achleitner et al., 2011; Brigl et al., 2008; 
Guo et al., 2011; Kaplan, 1989; Pindur, 2007). Obviously, the small scale of the 
Portuguese economy and the nature of the targets (private companies) result in quite a 
modest deal size when compared to international studies. 
 
Table 8: Portfolio companies´ characteristics in the exit/divestment year 
     
Variable Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
N 
Assets 28.266.564 12.014.735 40.581.773 30 
Liabilities 21.053.849 8.416.172 35.105.925 30 
Indebtedness (%) 71..94 66..72 38 30 
EBITDA 1.978.185 565.039 3.595.458 30 
number of 
employees 68 28 98 30 
    
Unit: euros 
  
In sum, we can conclude that the selected database allowed us to obtain a good 
sample of the investments and divestments of PE type / venture capital in Portugal. 
Furthermore, the results show that the market is small where there is little competition, 
since the five largest PE firms dominate about half the Portuguese market.  
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3.4. POST-EXIT PORTFOLIO COMPANIES´ ANALYSIS – OPERATING 
PERFORMANCE AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE  
 
With the aim of measuring the impact and dimension of changes / growth in 
portfolio companies after exit, we will calculate the change in the main accounting 
indicators, including: assets, turnover and EBITDA. These will allow us to answer the 
following research questions: Will the normal improvements expected by PE firms stands 
after an exit strategy or, instead, are easily eliminated? What happens to the capital 
structure of the company and operational performance after the exit strategy? 
 
3.4.1. GROWTH 
 
Table 9 reports the median growth in total assets, EBITDA and turnover for the 
four post-exit years.  
The results show a steady and significant growth in total assets, reaching its peak 
at 39.15% in fourth year post-exit. To all the years we get statistically significant results 
to a level of significance of 5%. The median increase in total assets over the three-year 
period equals 29.5% and is significant at the 5% level. Adjusted to industry we see the 
same tendency and with higher values all the years. However, unlike the analysis without 
industry adjustment, the results are not statistically significant.  
Turnover also exhibits a growth in all four post-exit years and a median three-year 
period average growth of 14.82%. These results are significant at least at the 10% level 
till the third year post-exit. Results adjusted to industry also show a growth all the years 
except in the last one (t+4). 
Although not statistically significant, portfolio companies exhibit a decrease in 
EBITDA over the three-year period post-exit of -24.21%. In all the years we see a higher 
decrease that gets worse year by year. However, once again these results are not 
statistically significant.  
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Table 9: Growth changes results (median variance) 
 
  
t-1..t+3 
(3y avg.) 
t-1...t+1 t-1...t+2 t-1...t+3 t-1...t+4 
PANEL A: Assets           
Variation (median) 29.5%** 12.71%** 22.06%** 33.32%** 39.15%** 
nº observations  20 28 24 20 17 
Variation (median) adjusted to industry 40.21% 27.51%** 39.83% 54.04% 45.39% 
nº observations  18 26 21 18 14 
PANEL B: Turnover           
Variation (median) 14.82%** 19.19%*** 4.15%* 4.75%* 20.18% 
nº observations  17 24 20 17 15 
Variation (median) adjusted to industry 13.05%* 29.03%** 13.33%* 16.76%* -5.29% 
nº observations  16 23 19 16 13 
PANEL C: EBITDA           
Variation (median) -24.21% -19.80% -25.15% -31.58% -50.39% 
nº observations  20 28 24 20 17 
Variation (median) adjusted to industry -95.58% -17.80% -79.68% -89.26% -61.34% 
nº observations  18 26 21 18 14 
*,**,*** significantly different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively 
   
 
These findings post-exit strategy show us that portfolio companies become larger 
not only during the holding period (results of Chung (2011) reveal that private targets 
become larger after the buyout), but also after an exit strategy, which means that 
companies after a divestment strategy continue to grow their business.  
 
 
3.4.2. OPERATING PERFORMANCE 
 
 The Table 10 shows the change in the operating performance after the exit.   
 
As we can see in Panel A, there is a decline of productivity in all the years 
comparing with the last full year before the exit, which leads to the conclusion that after 
an exit strategy the companies have less capacity to generate cash flows with their assets. 
In fact, after the exit the productivity falls in all four post-exit years: -0.04 p.p., -0.03 p.p., 
-0.04 p.p. and -0.03 p.p. in years t+1, t+2, t+3, and t+4, respectively. Adjusted by 
industry changes and during the same period the decrease of productivity after the exit 
strategy is even more severe in the years t+2, t+3 and t+4. This situation could be 
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explained by the absence of synergies previously created by the PE firms in their target 
companies that disappear after that. Nevertheless, none of these results are statistically 
relevant. 
However, even if profitability deteriorates, companies can still create value by 
increasing the productivity of their assets, for example by selling non-productive assets 
(Guo et al., 2011). 
 
Panel B show us the portfolio companies EBITDA margin and in all the years we 
have a decrease (median of -0.02, -0.03, -0.04 and -0.09 percentage points). This means 
that the operating margin of the company has a consistent annual decrease, but short. 
Thus, after an exit strategy we can say that companies continue to have a great EBITDA 
margin but with a low negative variations year by year. However, none of these 
variations is statistically relevant, revealing that the negative performance of portfolio 
companies´ post-exit can´t be justified by industry or by the companies itself.  
 These findings are consistent with Mendes (2011), who says that companies that 
have intervention by PE firms faced a performance in terms of profitability that after the 
investment has been deteriorating. The same applies after the exit.  
 
Finally, panel C presents the evolution of the assets rotation ratio (ratio between 
turnover and total assets). Analyzing the asset turnover ratio allow us to recognize if the 
changes in productivity are only the result of lower margins or also the result of a 
decrease in portfolio companies post-exit efficiency in using its assets to generate sales. 
The analysis of this indicator show us that in the first year after the exit strategy and 
comparing to the year before exit, there is an increase in the efficiency of the use of 
companies’ assets, while in the following years we assist to a little decrease (median of -
0.05, -0.04 and -0.09 percentage points in t+2, t+3 and t+3, respectively). These results 
lead us to the conclusion that there is a significant improvement in efficiency in the first 
year after the divestment, remaining relatively constant but with slight decreases 
thereafter. Considering the values adjusted by industry, the results are similar. However, 
and once again, none of these results are statistically significant except to the first year 
post-exit (adjusted by industry) with a level of significance of 10%.    
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Table 10: Operating performance ratios results (median variance) 
 
Year relating to the exit transaction t-1...t+1 t-1...t+2 t-1...t+3 t-1...t+4 
PANEL A: ROA         
Variation (median) p.p. -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 
nº observations  28 24 20 17 
Variation (median) adjusted to industry p.p -0.03 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 
nº observations  26 21 18 14 
PANEL B: EBITDA margin         
Variation (median) p.p. -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 
nº observations  24 20 17 15 
Variation (median) adjusted to industry p.p -0.03 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 
nº observations  23 19 16 13 
PANEL C: Turnover ratio         
Variation (median) p.p. 0.07 -0.05 -0.04 -0.09 
nº observations  24 20 17 15 
Variation (median) adjusted to industry p.p 0.09* -0.10 -0.14 -0.06 
nº observations  23 19 16 13 
*,**,*** significantly different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
  
 
These results show us that there is a decrease in ROA and EBITDA margin in the 
years after the exit strategy. However, the small decrease is not sufficient to get the 
conclusion that companies will not survive after the exit. Instead of that, we can conclude 
that despite slight negative variations of median, companies managed to maintain an 
operational performance within the normal and desirable values after the PE investor 
leaves the company.  
Regarding the turnover ratio (measure of efficiency) the results show that in the 
first year after the exit, turnover ratio increase and when adjusted to industry this median 
variance is statistically significant. However, there is a slight decrease in all the following 
years.  
In sum, it appears that after the PE investor leaves the company they continue to 
create value, although slightly less. The decline is essentially the result of a strong decline 
in the companies’ margins. However, is important to mention that among the 30 
companies in the sample five of them are dissolved nowadays.   
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3.4.3. CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
 
Table 11 shows the evolution of financial autonomy ratio after the exit and we can 
verify that the ratio decreases in the first and second year (median of -0.02 and -0.01 
percentage points, respectively) but increases in the third year (median of 0.01 percentage 
points). However, none of these variations is statistically relevant. These results show us 
that after the PE exit there is an increase on debt to financing of assets on target 
companies and then, in the third year after the exit strategy, a replacement of debt by 
equity. 
When adjusted the ratio to industry, the results are a little different. As we can see 
below, the financial autonomy has an increase in the first year after the exit (median of 
0.004 percentage points), following a decrease in the next three years (-0.08, -0.09, -0.11, 
in t+2, t+3 and t+4, respectively). Thus, these results indicate that in the first year after 
the divestment the target companies continue to have equity to finance their own business 
but after that, in t+2, t+3 and t+4, the autonomy ratio seems to be decreasing leading to 
the replacement of equity by debt. This negative change is not surprising since the 
divestment by PE firms necessarily imply an increase in the debt capital, thereby 
decreasing the percentage of assets financed by equity. Also, none of these variations is 
statistically relevant.  
 
Table 11: Autonomy ratio results (median variation) 
 
 
Year relating to the exit transaction t-1...t+1 t-1...t+2 t-1...t+3 t-1...t+4 
Autonomy ratio         
Variation (median) p.p. -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 
nº observations  28 24 20 17 
Variation(median) adjusted to industry p.p. 0.004 -0.08 -0.09 -0.11 
nº observations  26 21 18 14 
*,**,*** significantly different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively 
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3.5. OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE ANALYSIS BY 
EXIT ROUTE 
 
In Table 12 we present the financial autonomy ratio by exit route. The results 
show that in the first year after the exit the financial autonomy drops more after a 
buyback reflecting the necessity of new funds to buyback the shares belonging to the PE 
investors. However, in the long term the financial autonomy increases consistently. After 
a trade sale there is a constant evolution year by year with slight negative variations but 
not relevant. The evolution of the financial autonomy after a secondary buyout – a 
decrease in financial autonomy ratio – is consistent with the fact that the new PE fund 
will used even more debt to follow its strategy. 
 
Table 12: Financial autonomy ratio results by exit route (median variation) 
 
Financial autonomy ratio t-1...t+1 t-1...t+2 t-1...t+3 t-1...t+4 
Buyback 
    Variation (median) p.p. -0.06 0.09 0.07 0.01 
nº observations 10 8 6 4 
Variation (median) adjusted to industry p.p. -0.24 -0.12 -0.02 -0.13 
nº observations 8 5 4 1 
SOB 
    Variation (median) p.p. -0.01 -0.07 -0.08 -0.03 
nº observations 5 4 4 4 
Variation (median) adjusted to industry p.p. -0.01 -0.05 -0.19 -0.13 
nº observations 5 4 4 4 
Trade sale 
    Variation (median) p.p. -0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 
nº observations 13 12 10 9 
Variation (median) adjusted to industry p.p. 0.10 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 
nº observations 13 12 10 9 
*,**,*** significantly different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively 
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Table 13, shows that after a buyback the company has a more favorable evolution 
of the ROA when comparing with the previous year before exit (t-1) with median of 0.02, 
0.09 and 0.08 percentage points, respectively. After industry adjustments we can 
conclude also that in all the years the sample selected has a better performance than the 
ones in the same sector. Thus, companies that have intervention of PE firms have a 
greater performance when compared with all the sector companies. 
 
Table 13: ROA results by exit route (median variation) 
 
ROA t-1...t+1 t-1...t+2 t-1...t+3 t-1...t+4 
Buyback 
    Variation (median) p.p. -0.05 0.02 0.09 0.08 
nº observations 10 8 6 4 
Variation (median) adjusted to industry p.p. -0.06 -0.06 0.03 0.09 
nº observations 8 5 4 1 
SOB 
    Variation (median) p.p. -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 
nº observations 5 4 4 4 
Variation (median) adjusted to industry p.p. -0.08 -0.16 -0.12 -0.08 
nº observations 5 4 4 4 
Trade sale 
    Variation (median) p.p. -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 
nº observations 13 12 10 9 
Variation (median) adjusted to industry p.p. -0.001 -0.02 -0.07 -0.08 
nº observations 13 12 10 9 
*,**,*** significantly different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively       
 
 
Table 14 and 15 present the EBITDA margin and turnover, respectively. The 
results in both tables suggest us the same conclusions. The buyback is the exit route that 
allows the company a better operating performance and capital structure after the 
divestment of PE firms. This result suggests some asymmetric information between the 
entrepreneur and the private equity investor that leads the entrepreneur to benefit more 
after regain the full control in the company. This is not surprise if we believe that the 
entrepreneur have a better knowledge than the PE investor of the situation and future 
problems of the company.  
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Table14: EBITDA margin results by exit route (median variation) 
 
EBITDA MARGIN t-1...t+1 t-1...t+2 t-1...t+3 t-1...t+4 
Buyback 
    Variation (median) p.p. -0.04 0.06 0.17 0.19 
nº observations 8 6 5 3 
Variation (median) adjusted to industry p.p. -0.11 -0.09 -0.01 0.15 
nº observations 7 5 4 1 
SOB 
    Variation (median) p.p. -0.003 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 
nº observations 5 4 4 4 
Variation (median) adjusted to industry p.p. -0.06 -0.21 -0.15 -0.09 
nº observations 5 4 4 4 
Trade sale 
    Variation (median) p.p. -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 
nº observations 11 10 8 8 
Variation (median) adjusted to industry p.p. -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 
nº observations 11 10 8 8 
*,**,*** significantly different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively 
  
 
 
Table 15: Turnover ratio results by exit route (median variation) 
 
Turnover t-1...t+1 t-1...t+2 t-1...t+3 t-1...t+4 
Buyback 
    Variation (median) p.p. 0.07 -0.01 0.10 -0.09 
nº observations 8 6 5 3 
Variation (median) adjusted to industry p.p. 0.15 0.06 0.17 -0.06 
nº observations 7 5 4 1 
SOB 
    Variation (median) p.p. -0.12 -0.36 -0.41 -0.20 
nº observations 5 4 4 4 
Variation (median) adjusted to industry p.p. -0.13 -0.45 -0.47 -0.20 
nº observations 5 4 4 4 
Trade sale 
    Variation (median) p.p. 0.11 -0.04 -0.01 0.02 
nº observations 11 10 8 8 
Variation (median) adjusted to industry p.p. 0.12 -0.05 -0.11 0.03 
nº observations 11 10 8 8 
*,**,*** significantly different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively 
  
 
Overall, we can conclude that buyback is the exit route with better performance 
following the trade sale and then the SBO. It seems not to be consistent with Cumming 
and Macintosh (2003b) that show that higher quality portfolio companies are likely to be 
exited, in order of probability, by an IPO, a trade sale, a secondary sale, a buyback and a 
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write-off. Buyback occupies just the third position (considering the absence of IPO in 
Portugal). 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In Portugal, studies that aim to analyze the impact of PE industry tend to focus on 
a qualitative analysis of this industry, especially by conducting surveys about companies 
of PE. Although in the last years efforts have been made, particularly by conducting 
dissertations on this topic. These studies have focus on the impact during the holding 
phase (analyzing operating performance and capital structure), and there are no analysis 
in Portugal regarding the impact that PE firms continue to have even after an exit strategy 
in portfolio companies.  
This dissertation studies the Portuguese PE industry and examines the change on 
operating performance and on capital structure of portfolio companies after the PE 
investor leaves the company. We use a self-collected sample of 30 companies between 
2005 and 2012 (years with possible available data/information).  
 Analyzing the transactions occurred in Portugal, we can conclude that the 
Portuguese PE market is still a market far from its maturity. The more relevant period for 
exit transactions emerged in 2007 and 2008. Furthermore, it is a market with little 
competition dominated and controlled by four major PE houses and where banks and 
bank affiliate institutions are the main players.  
Regarding the post-exit operating performance and capital structure, the results 
show a decline of EBITDA in the years after the exit. Concerning turnover and assets we 
have different evolutions. We get a steady and significant growth in total assets and only 
a small growth in all four post-exit years in turnover. These findings are consistent with 
Chung (2011), suggesting that PE investors look for private companies with larger 
profitability and growth opportunities, even in long term (post-exit strategy). Also 
Jensen´s theory can be proved here when refers that organizational changes play an 
important role in the efficiency gains. 
Although portfolio companies increase their assets and turnover significantly after 
the exit, their operating performance is very poor. 
The analysis of the three operating performance measures – return on sales as 
measure of profitability, return on assets as a measure of productivity and asset turnover 
as measure of efficiency – leads to the conclusion that the operating performance does 
not improve and even deteriorates in the years after the exit strategy. All the three 
measures exhibit an inferior performance when compared to the last full year before the 
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exit. However, none of the measures proved to be statistically significant. Industry-
adjustment reveals that the operating performance is below the industry, suggesting that 
the low performance is only slightly explained by time and industry effects. 
Also, after the exit our results show a decline in the financial autonomy. This 
negative change is not surprising since the divestment by PE firms necessarily imply an 
increase in the debt capital, thereby decreasing the percentage of assets financed by 
equity.  
  
Finally, I would suggest some topics for future research. Firstly, aware of the 
limitations that this dissertation presents, would be relevant to do a review of this 
dissertation in the future due to the restrictions related to the sample size. More 
transactions could trigger better and more efficient conclusions. Moreover, would be 
interesting to assess the impact of PE after exit on a longer horizon, as well as between 
different countries. 
 On the other hand, given the apparent ability to create value in this type of 
investment, it is also important to understand how this is achieved, trying to measure the 
importance of different factors of the value creation. This implies a more detailed and 
complex data information.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Acharya, V., O. Gottschalg, M, Hahn e C, Kehoe (2013), “Corporate Governance and 
Value Creation: Evidence from Private Equity”, The Review of Financial Studies, 
Vol. 26, Nº2, pp. 368-402. 
Achleitner, A., Braun, R., Engel, N., Figge, C, and Tappeiner, F. (2010), “Value Creation 
Drivers in Private Equity Buyouts: Empirical Evidence from Europe”, The Journal 
of Private Equity, Vol. 13, No. 2, p. 17-27,  
Achleitner, A., Braun, R., Engel, N. (2011), “Value Creation and pricing in buyouts: 
Empirical Evidence from Europe and North America”, Center for Entrepreneurial 
and Financial Studies (CEFS), Technische Universität München, TUM School of 
Management, Arcisstr, 21, 80333 Munich, Germany, p. 146-161. 
Axelson, U., Jenkinson, T., Stromberg, P., Weisbachm M. S. (2010), “Borrow Cheap, 
Buy High? The Determinants of Leverage and Pricing in Buyouts”, working paper. 
Baker, G. P. and Montgomery, C. A. (1994), “Conglomerates and LBO associations: A 
comparision of organizational forms” Harvard Business School, Working Paper, 
November 4, p. 1-34. 
Bascha, A., Walz, U. (2001), “Convertible securities and optimal exit decisions in 
venture capital finance”, Journal of Corporate Finance, No. 7, pp. 285-306. 
Berg, A. and O. Gottschalg (2003), "Understanding value generation in buyouts." 
INSEAD working paper (April 2003). 
CMVM (2012), “Relatório Anual da Atividade de Capital de Risco 2012”. 
Chung, J. (2011), “Leveraged Buyouts of Private Companies”, Working Paper, The 
Chinese University of Hong Kong.  
Cumming, D. J., Macintosh, J., G. (2001), “Venture capital investment duration in 
Canada and the United States”, Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 
No. 11, pp. 445-463. 
Cumming, D. J., Macintosh, J., G. (2003a), “A cross-country comparison of full and 
partial exits”, Journal of Banking and Science, No. 27, pp. 511-548. 
Cumming, D. J., Macintosh, J., G. (2003b), “Venture Capital Exits in Canada and the 
United States”, University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 53, pp. 101-200. 
Cumming, D. J., Siegel D. S., Wright, M., (2007), “Private equity, leveraged buyouts and 
governance” Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 13, pp. 439-460. 
36 
 
EVCA (July 2013), “Central and Eastern Europe Statistics 2012” An EVCA special Paper 
edited by the EVCA Central and Eastern Europe Task. 
EVCA (2012), “EVCA yearbook 2012: European and Country tables”. 
EVCA (2010), “Better Exist - Results of a survey of the Venture Capital exit market and 
guidance on how Venture Capitalists can improve exit performance” Written by 
John Wall and Julian Smith, Price Waterhouse Corporate Finance. 
Faria, P. (2009), “Capital de Risco: Análise comparativa à evolução do investimento em 
Portugal e na Europa”, Dissertation submitted during the course of Master in 
Finance – ISCTE Business School. 
Ferreira, H. (2009), “Capital de Risco: Análise comparativa à evolução do 
desinvestimento em Portugal e na Europa”, Dissertation submitted during the course 
of Master in Finance – ISCTE Business School. 
Gompers, P., Lerner, J. (1998), “Venture Capital Distributions: Short-Run and Long-Run 
Reactions”, Journal of Finance, Vol. LIII, No. 6, p. 2161-2183. 
Gompers, P., Lerner, J. (1999), “The Venture Capital Cycle”, Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Groh, A., Gottschalg, O. (2009), “The opportunity cost of capital of US buyouts 
”Working paper, WP 78, IESE – Business school University of Navarra. 
Grossman, S. J. and O. Hart (1982), “Corporate financial structure and managerial 
incentives, in: The economics of information and uncertainty”. J. McCall(Ed.). 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press: 107-140. 
Guo, S., Hotchkiss, E. and Song, W. (2011), “Do buyouts (still) create value?”, Journal 
of Finance, Vol. 66, No. 2, p. 479-517. 
Jain, B. A. and Kini, O. (1994), “The post-issue operating performance of IPO firms”, 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 49, No. 5, p. 1699-1726. 
Jensen, M. C. (1989), “Eclipse of the public corporation”, Harvard Business Review, 
September-October 1989, p. 61-74. 
Jensen, M. C. (1986), “Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers”, 
American Economic Review 76, p. 323-330. 
Jensen, M. C. Burkhardt, W., Barry, B. K. (1992), "Wisconsin Central Ltd, Railroad and 
Berkshire Partners (A): Leveraged Buyouts and Financial Distress," Harvard 
Business School. 
Kaplan, S. N. (1989), “The effects of management buyouts on operating performance and 
value”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 24, No. 2, p. 217-254. 
37 
 
Kaplan, S. N., and A. Schoar (2005), “Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence, 
and Capital Flows”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. LX, No. 4, p.1791-1823. 
Kaplan, S. N. and Stromberg P. (2009), “Leveraged buyouts and private equity” NBER 
Working paper series 14207. 
Kaplan, S. N. and J. C. Stein (1993), "The evolution of pricing and financial structure in 
the 1980s", Quarterly Journal of Economics 108(2): 313. 
Lichtenberg, F. R. and Siegel, D. (1990), “The effects of leveraged buyouts on 
productivity and related aspects of firm behavior”, Journal of Financial Economics, 
Vol. 27, No. 1, p. 165-194. 
Lieber, D. (2004), “Proactive Portfolio Management: Manage Now to Realize Returns 
Later”, The Journal of Private Equity, No. 1, Spring, pp. 72-82. 
Loos, N., (2005), "Value Creation in Leveraged Buyouts: Analysis of Driving Private 
Equity Investment Performance" Gabler Edition Wissenschaft. 
Mendes, José (2011), “Private Equity in Portugal – An analysis of the portfolio 
companies’ operating performance”, Dissertação de mestrado em Finanças, 
Faculdade de Economia do Porto. 
Nikoskelainen, E. and Wright, M. (2007), “The impact of corporate governance 
mechanisms on value increase in leveraged buyouts”, Journal of Corporate 
Finance, Vol. 13, No. 4, p. 511-537. 
Opler, T. and S. Titman (1993), "The determinants of leveraged buyout activity: Free 
cash flow vs. financial distress costs", Journal of Finance, 48(5): 1985. 
Palepu, K. G. (1990), "Consequences of leveraged buyouts", Journal of Financial 
Economics 27(1): 247. 
Pindur, D. (2007), "Value creation in successful LBO´S", with a foreword by Prof. Dr. 
Frank Richter.   
Povaly, S. (2007),”Private Equity Exits: Divestment process management for Leveraged 
Buyouts” Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007, Dissertation no. 3238. 
Ross, S. A. (1977), "The determination of financial structure: the incentive-signaling 
approach", Bell Journal of Economics 8(1): 23. 
Shepherd, D., A., Zacharakis, A., Baron, R., A. (2003), “VCs’ decision processes: 
Evidence suggesting more experience may not always be better”, Journal of 
Business Venturing, No. 18, pp. 381–401. 
Smith, A. (1990), "The effects of leveraged buyouts" Business Economics 25(2): 19. 
38 
 
Wright, M., Robbie, K. (1998), “Venture Capital and Private Equity: A Review and 
Synthesis”, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 25, No. 5-6, pp. 521-
570. 
Wright, M., Robbie, K., Romanet, Y., Thompson, S., Joachimsson, R., Bruining, H. and 
Herst, A. (1993), Harvesting and the longevity of management buyouts and buy-
ins: A four country study, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 18: 90–109. 
  
39 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Capital IQ database 
 
Capital IQ is a database commercialized and managed by Standards & Poor’s which 
began its data services in 1999. As all databases, Capital IQ has as well some sample 
issues and potential biases. This database covered a lot of transactions, however, is 
incomplete for some older and younger transactions. We found during the study many 
other companies/transactions in Portugal that do not appear in the Capital IQ. On the 
other hand, since this database is in continuous update process probably even some recent 
transactions may not appear. However, taking into account these potential distortions, we 
believe that the sample collected covers most of the transactions that occurred in Portugal 
and is the best representation of the PE industry in Portugal. 
 
SABI database 
 
The SABI database is marketed and managed by Bureau Van Dijk and contains 
accounting and other financial information for more than 20.000 Portuguese companies 
for 10 years (2003-2012),  
The first distortion we found has to do with the fact that not covers the entire Portuguese 
business market by some companies identified in our database Capital IQ. The sample is 
small (30 companies) and could be higher if there were sufficient accounting information 
for all the companies extracted in Capital IQ. The period of time covered by this database 
is also a distortion because we only have accounting information from 2003 to 2012 and 
companies that had the divestment before 2003 we don´t find no data (which led to the 
exclusion of some companies).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
